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governors? Are these creative clusters continuing to strive, stagnate, or develop in a different 
direction instead?  
The central purpose of this research is to analyze to what extent creativity is: 1) used 
as a strategic measurement to achieve economic revitalization; 2) seen as a starting point but 
not considered to be the only approach to solve the problem, or; 3) is it instead the original, 
historical potential and image of an area which should be used instead of creative policies to 
achieve the social and economical development of a neighbourhood as a whole?  
 
The research 
Understanding the different neighbourhoods of Yokohama as unique micro units of a big 
metropolis, the research will present an in-depth sociological portrait of contemporary 
Yokohama and specific neighbourhoods which mirror past and current tensions that emerge 
between old and new; low and high (rise); tradition and modernity; original and replica; decay 
and recovering; erosion and revitalisation; and personal and collective forms of inhabitation 
and occupation. Offering a microscopic, critical investigation of how different people, groups 
and stakeholder shape and have been shaped by each neighbourhood, the research will provide 
a multi-dimensional, multi-vocal and inclusive interpretation of a city, which is in the 
theoretical, spatial and social sense, a place situated ‘in-between’ different processes, trends 
and broader discourses focussing on culture and politics; local and global economy; and social 
attachment and alienation. 
The research will set the scope to see the city as a cultural, social space and space of 
economic transactions (in providing narratives of hyper-traditional vendors, hyper-modern 
actors as social entrepreneurs to just to name a few). In asking questions about the what? 
where?, when? and why?, I explore seven contemporary neighbourhoods, first sketching the 
context and image of eachneighbourhood before discussing aspects and the changing everyday 
life in Yokohama – including globalization and modernization; upgrading and gentrification; 
decay and recovery; personalfailureand success; and forced or voluntary relocation, which are 
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Abstract 
From the late 1990s, the Japanese government began to introduce new innovation policies 
to create a biotechnology industry for the nation. The government has successfully created 
a plethora of bioventures during the mid-2000s but since then the growth of bioventures has 
plateaued. This research note examines the present state of listed bioventures in Japan and 
analyzes what is required for such firms to remain competitive.   
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1. Japanese Bioventures 
 
“Bioventure” is a term used in Japan to describe biotechnology start-ups and biotechnology 
ventures, irrespective of the sources of funding. The official agency responsible for 
conducting and compiling yearly data on bioventures is the Japan Bioindustry Association, 
(JBA).  The JBA defines a bioventure as a company that fulfills the following criteria: -  
i) A company which does business with biotechnology as a means or objective;  
ii) A company that has the required number of employees to be defined as a SME under 
the Basic Law on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises; 
iii) A company established prior to 1986. The objective here is to distinguish new 
biotechnology from old biotechnology. The latter focuses on the use of genetic 
engineering such as recombinant DNA, hybridoma technology, cell fusion, and 





In the early 1980s, Japanese industrialists and bureaucrats witnessed the growth of the 
modern biotechnology industry, led by new biotechnology firms such as Genentech and 
Amgen in the U.S. Inspired by this progression, the Japanese government began to introduce 
new policies and reforms to help promote biotechnology as a key future technology. One of 
central strategies was the promotion of bioventures, because biotechnology start-ups in the 
US played the key role in developing the industry. According to Orsenigo (1989), 
biotechnology start-ups were responsible for most of the research in genetic engineering in 
the early years and heavily contributed to determining the direction of technical change. 
Biotechnology start-ups also have greater capabilities in biotechnology than large incumbent 
companies in the pharmaceutical sphere (Grabowski & Vernon 1994). 
 
In the late 1990s, Japan’s innovation system began to change to accommodate the 
establishment of more technology start-ups. Profound changes can be found in four broad 
areas. Firstly, there was an increase in the government R&D budgets for basic research. 
Following Japan's Science and Technology Basic Law (established in 1995), the government 
doubled its R&D budget for life sciences, which included biotechnology, from around US$2 
billion in 1995 to more than US$4 billion in 2001. Much of the increase in R&D funding 
went towards supporting genome research in basic biology (Miyata 1994; Collins 2004). 
Secondly, profound changes were made in the legal and policy framework to encourage 
university-industry links. In May 1998, the Japanese government passed the Technology 
Transfer Law, otherwise known as the Technology Licensing Offices (TLO) Law to 
legitimize and facilitate transparent, contractual transfers of university discoveries to 
industry. Professors can also voluntarily assign their individually-owned inventions to TLOs. 
In 1997, the restrictions preventing professors from starting their own businesses or 
becoming directors or employees of private firms were relaxed. In April 2000, the Law to 
Strengthen Industrial Technology permits faculty at national universities to work for, or 
establish, private ventures that aim to commercialize their research efforts.  
 
Thirdly, reforms were made in intellectual property. In October 1999, the Law of Special 
Measure to Revive Industry (Japanese version of the Bayh-Dole Act) was passed to allow 
 
 
the private sector to hold ownership of intellectual property rights generated under 
government-funded research. This law made it easier for private firms to obtain licenses for 
national inventions. It also gave incentives for university researchers to commercialize their 
inventions through patent fee reduction. Lastly, the Japanese government created new stock 
markets for the listing of high growth companies and made significant changes in 
commercial code law. In 1999, the Tokyo Stock Exchange opened the Market of the High-
Growth and Emerging Stocks (MOTHERS) to promote the listings of high growth 
companies. Companies can be listed on MOTHERS without showing a profit and by meeting 
the minimum JPY500 million (approximately US$5 million) market capitalization. The 
opening of new stock markets served to increase the opportunities for entrepreneurs to raise 
funds in the early stages of businesses and for venture capital investors to exit their 
investments. In 2001, Japanese Commercial Code Law liberalized the use of stock option 
schemes and allowed stock options to be issued. In addition, the minimum capital 
requirement to establish a stock company was reduced from JPY10 million (approximately 
US$100,000) to a mere JPY1, provided that the new company is established to start a new 
business and on the condition that the capital is increased to at least JPY10 million within 
five years of establishment. 
 
Because of the above policy changes, in the span of ten years from 1995 to 2005, the 
number of Japanese bioventures increased by more than fivefold: from 116 to 531. In 2002, 
the first two bioventures made their debut in the Japanese stock exchange market. By 2005, 
twelve bioventures were listed in the Japanese stock exchanges. The remarkable growth and 
the sheer number of bioventures during this period indicates that the Japanese government 
achieved one of its long-term goals, namely promoting bioventures as an engine for the 
industrialization of biotechnology industry (Eyo 2014). 
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The JBA is the official agency that is responsible for conducting and compiling yearly data 
on bioventures, yet it ceased to conduct its survey on bioventures in 2016. According to 
JBA’s last report in 2015, there are 553 bioventures in Japan. Out of the 553, 40.2% are 
involved in the field of medical and healthcare and 37.6% are involved in the field of 
providing research support. JBA’s survey showed that there was a rapid growth of new 
bioventures from 1992 to 2006. However, from 2007 to 2014 the growth of new bioventures 
has plateaued (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The Growth of Bioventures from 1992 to 2014 
 
Source: JBA, 2015 
 
In terms of geography, the Kanto region is home to 50% of the total bioventures, 
followed by Kinki region with approximately 21%. The Chuto region has about 9% and 
Kyushu region around 7%. Even though the number of bioventures has hovered around 500 
for the last decade, a closer examination reveals that majority of the bioventures are small, 
based on metrics such as capital, sales, number of employees, R&D expenses and 



























JPY650 million; the average sales per bioventure is JPY238 million; the average operating 
loss per bioventure is JPY105.6 million yen, and the average R&D expenses per bioventure 
is JPY113.6 million. In terms of employment, the average number of employee per 
bioventure is 18 (See Table 1) (JBA 2015). 
 
Table 1: Bioventures Statistics  
 
Sources: JBA, 2015  
 
The number of newly created bioventures peaked in 2004 and since then, fewer and 
fewer number of new bioventures have been created each year. In 2014 for example, only 
two new bioventures are established (see Figure 2). The number of newly created bioventures 
is an important figure because there is a need for these start-up flowers to bloom. Some will 
grow, and some will not. Therefore, this is a disturbing trend because it indicates the 
following: -  
1) Many entrepreneurs are pessimistic about the future of biotechnology, and hence the 
reluctance to set up new bioventures.  
2) The declining number of core technologies being commercialized from the 
universities or transferred to start-ups  
3) There will be no new substantial financial incentives or grants from the governments.  
 
  
Median Mean Maximum Minimum
Capital  (in millions of yen) 40.0 650.7 14,874 2
Sales (in millions of yen) 62.0 238.0 6,665 0
Sales related to biotechnology (in millions of yen) 62.0 242.1 6,665 0
Operating profit (in millions of yen) 0.0 (105.6) 264 (2,259)
R&D expenses (in millions of yen) 20.0 113.6 2,300 0
Number of employees 7 18 237 1
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Figure 2: Number of newly created bioventures from 1992 to 2015 
 
Source: JBA, 2015 
 
In addition, there is an increased trend of number of bioventures discontinuing their 
business since 2005 (see Figure 3). Although this is to be expected, this trend also gives 
indication to the following: - 1) more and more existing bioventures are running out of money 
to finance their operations, and 2) venture capital investment and private funding into 
bioventures has reduced. The number of bioventures that cease operations will continue to 
increase because this is a R&D intensive industry. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug 
Development estimated that a new drug generally takes 10 to 15 years from discovery and 
early research to approval. The average out-of-pocket cost per new drug is approximate $1.4 
billion (DiMasi, Grabowski & Hansen 2016). The long and costly process means that only 
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Figure 3: Number of bioventures that ceased operations from 1992 to 2014 
 




The success of a nation’s biotechnology industry is measured not by the number of 
bioventures, but rather the market capitalization and the market share of biopharmaceutical 
drugs. Hence in this case, “big is beautiful”. Bigger bioventures with substantial finances 
will be able to continue their R&D and survive the long and costly drug development process. 
If their pipelines have the potential to be developed into innovative drugs, numerous 
collaborations with the bigger pharmaceutical companies including licensing agreement are 
likely to take place. One way to determine the success of Japan’s biotechnology industry is 
to analyze the performance of its listed bioventures (see Table 2). Listed bioventures provide 
an overall outlook of Japan’s biotechnology industry. Although the number of listed 
bioventures represents only 8% of the total number of bioventures in Japan, these bioventures 
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As for December 2018, there are about 44 listed bioventures in Japan. However, Table 
2 shows only 34 bioventures. The reason is Table 2 is compiled based on the following 
criteria: - 1) engaged mainly in the activities of drug research and development. Hence, 
bioventures engage in providing equipment, reagent or food supplementary are omitted from 
Table 2. 2) established after 1986. This is a criterion set by JBA to distinguish bioventures 
using new biotechnology from old biotechnology. The assumption here is bioventures that 
are established after 1986 are more likely to be engaged in new biotechnology activities. 
 Table 2 shows that bioventures with the biggest market capitalization are Pepti Dream 
with JPY579 billion, followed by SanBio with JPY430 billion, and Takara Bio with JPY319 
billion. The total market capitalization for all 34 listed bioventures is only JPY1, 863 billion. 
In comparison, Amgen the biggest biotechnology company in the US has a market 
capitalization of US$125 billion (approximately JPY13,527 billion) as of December 31, 2018. 
The total revenue achieved by all the 34 listed bioventures is JPY74 billion. In 2017, Amgen 
alone recorded sales of US$23 billion (approximately JPY2,489 billion). Only a handful 
bioventures such as Soiken, Trans Genic, Pepti Dream, Takara Bio, GNI Pharma and JTEC 
recorded a net profit. The rest of the industry, 28 out of 34 listed bioventures, recorded a net 
loss according to their latest financial statements.  




Table 2: Japanese Listed Bioventures (Market Capitalization, Sales and Profit) 
Source: Bloomberg, 2018 and respective bioventures’ website. Sales and profit are 2018 figure unless 
indicated otherwise in Note. 
  
No. Name of Bioventures Core biotechnology business Market 
Capitalization 







1 Soiken Drug discovery support services 11.536 5,455.00 205.90
2 Trans Genic Drug discovery support services 7.799 3,601.30 20.90
3 Human Metabolome 
Technologies
Drug discovery support services 6.512 938.20 (156.50)
4 DNA Chip Research Drug discovery support services 2.988 362.80 (127.60)
5 PhoenixBio Drug discovery support services 2.718 902.40 (270.80)
6 Pepti Dream Discovery and development platform 578.646 6,426.90 2,335.20
7 NanoCarrier Discovery and development platform 15.429 259.00 (5,304.00)
8 Chiome Bioscience Discovery and development platform 6.240 259.90 (882.60) 2017
9 Ribomic Discovery and development platform 4.777 64.70 (753.00)
10 Carna Biosciences Discovery and development platform 10.451 657.50 (737.30) 2017
11 Takara Bio Development of proprietary pipelines 318.740 32,312.00 2,335.00
12 OncoTherapy Science Development of proprietary pipelines 19.408 211.30 (2,926.20)
13 Kubota Pharmaceutical Development of proprietary pipelines 9.820 0.00 (3,444.60) 2017
14 DWTI Development of proprietary pipelines 10.536 254.00 (1,589.70) 2017
15 AnGes MG Development of proprietary pipelines 36.845 365.20 (3,764.70) 2017
16 Gene Techno Science Development of proprietary pipelines 14.661 1,059.70 (904.60)
17 Medtrx Development of proprietary pipelines 5.179 198.20 (884.40) 2017
18 Raqualia Development of proprietary pipelines 18.513 1,419.20 (58.10) 2017
19 CanBas Development of proprietary pipelines 2.641 110.00 (532.10)
20 Oncyols Biopharma Development of proprietary pipelines 11.147 229.10 (1,090.70) 2017
21 Bright Path Bio Development of proprietary pipelines 8.061 354.40 (1,578.40)
22 Sosei Group Development of in-licensing pipelines 66.077 6,955.00 (2,654.00)
23 MediciNova Development of in-licensing pipelines 39.285 0.00 (11.90) 2017
24 GNI Pharma Development of in-licensing pipelines 46.194 2,648.40 28.20 2017
25 SymBio Pharma Development of in-licensing pipelines 15.550 3,444.20 (3,977.90) 2017
26 Solasia Pharma Development of in-licensing pipelines 16.352 410.90 (1,007.50) 2017
27 UMN Pharma Development of in-licensing pipelines 4.405 104.10 (159.10) 2017
28 JTEC R&D of renegerative medicine 33.869 2,271.50 227.90
29 3D Matrix R&D of renegerative medicine 10.441 228.60 (1,866.20)
30 Cell Seed R&D of renegerative medicine 8.332 85.10 (966.50) 2017
31 SanBio R&D of renegerative medicine 430.068 490.50 (3,940.30)
32 Healios R&D of renegerative medicine 78.458 27.70 (1,776.70) 2017
33 Tella R&D of renegerative medicine 
(cancer vaccine)
3.691 957.60 (638.60) 2017
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Table 3: Japanese Listed Bioventures (Established Year, IPO Year, Capital Raised at IPO)
Source: Bloomberg, 2018 and respective bioventures’ website.   
  
 In the last 20 years, there were two biotech booms. The first boom ran from 2003 to 
2006, three years after the heady days of genomic bubble in the US. During this period, new 
innovation policies and regulatory shifts by the Japanese government towards biotechnology, 
made this a ‘hot’ sector. After the first bubble had burst, the sector went from ‘hot’ to ‘cool’ 
No. Name of Bioventures Year
Established
IPO Year IPO Year - 
Year Established







1 Soiken 2001 2003 2 17 15 10,335
2 Trans Genic 1998 2002 4 20 16 3,654
3 Human Metabolome Technologies 2003 2013 10 15 5 2,200
4 DNA Chip Research 1999 2004 5 19 14 2,720
5 PhoenixBio 2002 2016 14 16 2 1,132
6 Pepti Dream 2006 2013 7 12 5 7,763
7 NanoCarrier 1996 2008 12 22 10 759
8 Chiome Bioscience 2005 2011 6 13 7 2,412
9 Ribomic 2003 2014 11 15 4 5,724
10 Carna Biosciences 2003 2008 5 15 10 1,100
11 Takara Bio 2002 2004 2 16 14 9,000
12 OncoTherapy Science 2001 2003 2 17 15 17,000
13 Kubota Pharmaceutical 2002 2014 12 16 4 16,532
14 DWTI 1999 2009 10 19 9 1,253
15 AnGes MG 1999 2002 3 19 16 5,236
16 Gene Techno Science 2001 2012 11 17 6 1,200
17 MedRx 2002 2013 11 16 5 2,680
18 Raqualia 2008 2011 3 10 7 7,360
19 CanBas 2000 2009 9 18 9 1,546
20 Oncolys Biopharma 2004 2013 9 14 5 6,638
21 Bright Path Bio 2003 2015 12 15 3 6,496
22 Sosei Group 1990 2004 14 28 14 14,168
23 MediciNova 2000 2005 5 18 13 13,800
24 GNI Pharma 2001 2007 6 17 11 1,414
25 SymBio Pharma 2005 2011 6 13 7 3,284
26 Solasia Pharma 2007 2017 10 11 1 3,596
27 UMN Pharma 2004 2012 8 14 6 4,261
28 JTEC 1999 2007 8 19 11 3,982
29 3D Matrix 2004 2011 7 14 7 4,302
30 Cell Seed 2001 2010 9 17 8 3,497
31 SanBio 2001 2015 14 17 3 14,950
32 Healios 2011 2015 4 7 3 8,363
33 Tella 2004 2009 5 14 9 620
34 Medinet 1995 2003 8 23 15 5,635
7.76 16.26 8.5 5,724Average 
 
 
and the investor sentiment was largely negative. The second biotech boom occurred between 
2013 and 2015. The second boom largely shadowed the US biotech boom, except in scale 
and volume. During this period, there was renewed optimism for the sector and for new 
biomedical product innovations. The positive investor sentiment manifested itself across the 
public and private markets, fundraising metrics, IPOs, secondary offerings and partnering 
activity.  
 Bioventures that achieved IPO during the biotech booms enjoyed an extraordinary surge 
in their IPO price which allowed them to take advantage of the robust financing. In addition, 
these bioventures’ market valuation soared in comparison to their counterparts. Specific 
bioventures even saw their valuations inflate beyond what can reasonably be supported by 
future cash flows. On the other hand, bioventures that were listed during the post-crisis 
period, from 2008 to 2012 for example, had to deal with drying capital markets and their 
market valuations suffered.  
 The IPO funding model experienced by the Japanese bioventures is quite different from 
the typical IPO funding model practiced by biotechnology start-ups in the US. For the most 
part, Japanese bioventures lack angel investment and/or sufficient venture capital funding 
before staging for an IPO. The funding amount raised by IPO alone is often not enough 
considering the capital-intensive nature of biotech R&D (Eyo 2014). In recent years, 
mounting strains on the IPO funding model has led to much speculation that the model is 
broken. As indicated by Table 3, the amount of capital raised is largely determined by market 
timing. Perhaps the biggest strain on the model is the disconnect between the amount of IPO 
raised and the escalating cost of R&D. 
 
4. Conclusion  
The biotechnology industry in Japan continues to face a “new normal”, where existing 
bioventures struggle to survive and new bioventures compete for restricted access to funding. 
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before staging for an IPO. The funding amount raised by IPO alone is often not enough 
considering the capital-intensive nature of biotech R&D (Eyo 2014). In recent years, 
mounting strains on the IPO funding model has led to much speculation that the model is 
broken. As indicated by Table 3, the amount of capital raised is largely determined by market 
timing. Perhaps the biggest strain on the model is the disconnect between the amount of IPO 
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4. Conclusion  
The biotechnology industry in Japan continues to face a “new normal”, where existing 
bioventures struggle to survive and new bioventures compete for restricted access to funding. 
With a declining number of newly created bioventures, a sub-par performance by the listed 
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bioventures and a continuity uncertainty of the market, what are the strategies for Japan’s 
biotechnology industry to remain competitive?  
 Firstly, Japanese bioventures need to understand that survival requires the adoption of 
emerging technologies and/or business model innovations. To survive, Japanese bioventures 
need to improve on their R&D productivity. One of the ways is to embrace emerging 
technologies such as digital and artificial intelligence (AI), and big data. According to a 
report by Ernst & Young, an emerging cluster of firms are using AI to generate viable drug 
targets and leads, more rapidly than conventional means. Although biology’s complexity 
remains overwhelming for even the most intelligent system, the use of AI and computer 
processing will streamline components of the drug discovery process; for example, allowing 
a rapid screening of huge numbers of molecules. In addition, the use of big data can help 
biotechnology companies to decipher a disease’s biological derivation or a drug’s cause of 
action. This might involve identifying a pathway to target or understanding the likely impact 
of a certain treatment. (Ernst & Young 2017).  In addition, Japanese bioventures need to find 
the right leapfrog technologies to boost their R&D efficiency and to speed up their R&D 
productivity.  
 Secondly, Japanese bioventures should not rely entirely on the IPO funding model. If 
history has taught us anything, it is that the market will cycle through periods of expansion 
and contraction. During periods of contraction, the use of creative business models can 
provide cash flow for bioventures while waiting for the market to recover. For example, 
biotechnology companies such as Nimbus Therapeutics, Rhythm Holdings, and Adimab 
have developed pipelines by managing their operations through limited liability 
“passthrough entities” that allow for the sale of specific assets in a tax-efficient manner. In 
2016, Nimbus sold Nonalcoholic Steatohepatitis (NASH) asset to Gilead for US$400 million 
upfront and US$400 million in potential milestone payments. Rhythm sold Actavis an option 
to acquire its gastro-intestinal focused subsidiary, keeping intact a separate metabolic disease 
program (Ernst & Young 2017).  
 Alliances and partnerships remain key to success in this industry. Given that the product 
development in biotechnology is costly and associated with highly uncertain returns, 
 
 
biotechnology companies seek to share cost and risk of innovations through strategic 
partnership. By partnering with pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology companies gain 
access to production facilities, distribution channels and expertise regarding clinical 
development and government approval of new products. Although many Japanese 
bioventures have some kind of collaborative research agreements with other companies, 
most of these collaborations involved domestic firms, research institutes and universities. 
Alliances between Japanese bioventures and pharmaceutical companies (both inside and 
outside of Japan) remain weak (Kneller 2003). Alliances and partnerships formed by 
Japanese bioventures are generally small compared to the mega acquisitions and deals 
brokered between pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology companies abroad. When it 
comes developing alliances and partnerships, Japanese pharmaceutical companies need to 
step up their role to bridge the gap between proof-of-concept stage and drug development 
stage. Japanese pharmaceutical companies need to change their mind-set of ‘not-invented-
here’ to a mindset where they are more willing to accept risk by partnering with 
biotechnology companies, particularly domestic bioventures.  
 The biotechnology industry is a truly global one. Japanese bioventures are no longer 
competing among themselves but against tens of thousands of other biotechnology 
companies globally. Many smaller bioventures will eventually fail, some lucky bioventures 
will eventually exit through an M&A with a larger player and only a handful of bioventures 
will emerge as dominant players in this industry. The long development cycles of biotech, 
changes in regulatory policies and uncertainty in the market will continue to make this 
industry a challenge. But historically, the companies that succeed in bringing breakthrough 
products to market and the investors who back them have reaped handsome returns. Most 
importantly, the innovations brought by biotechnology industry continue to save and 
improve millions of lives and perhaps this is the reason why bioventures continue to 
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す上で不可欠である(Ferris and Roberts, 2014)。しかしながら組織においては、文法を
指導する時間が十分にとれないことが多く(Cavaleri and Dianeti, 2015)、コンピュー
タ・ベースのサポートやオンラインによるサポートは好都合であろう。本研究では、








The world of online grammar check tools has rapidly evolved to now offer an integrated system 
of feedback on written English, which has been driven by an explosion in the volume of written 
communication the world now produces: in emails, on social messaging sites and forums. This 
new type of writing assistance has become a lucrative, and subsequently competitive, market. 
Grammarly, launched in 2008, is considered the biggest with an estimated 6.9 million daily users, 
but alternatives such as Prowriting Aid and Ginger are becoming increasingly popular.  
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